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Two types of learning task, as well as the presence 
or absence of retrieval cues, were examined for their 
effects on long-term recognition memory for random shapes. 
Twenty college student subjects learned to associate the 
number "1n with five of ten 24-point random shapes, as used 
by Vanderplas & Garvin (1959), and a "2"  with the other 
five shapes (Group 2). Twenty other subjects learned 
to associate a unique number, from one to ten, with each 
of the same ten shapes (Group 10). One week after the 
subjects had learned the shapes (to a criterion of three 
successive correct trials) a recognition test for the 
shapes was given. The recognition test was given with two 
cards, each containing fifteen 24-point random shapes 
(five "old" shapes and ten distractors). On one set of 
cards all "old" shapes on each card had the same response 
number, while on another set of cards the shapes were 
randomly assigned to each card. Half of the subjects 
in Group 2 were given the former type of cards (categorized) 
while the other half of the subjects in Group 2 used the 
latter type of cards (uncategorized).  Subjects receiving 
the categorized cards were informed of the categorization. 
Half of the subjects in Group 10 received a set of cards 
on which the "old" shapes were arranged in serial order 
according to the numbers associated with the shapes 
(categorized) while the other subjects in Group 10 received 
cards containing "old" shapes which had been ordered 
randomly (uncategorized). 
The recognition scores were very high for all groups. 
Group 2 and Group 10 subjects who received categorized tests 
differed significantly in recognition performance (the 
former with 88$ and the latter with 98$ recognition 
performance). Analysis of learning performance indicated 
that Group 2 and Group 10 did not differ in learning 
speed, though chance performance should have enabled 
Group 2 subjects to learn faster. A processing limit of 
2±1 shapes per trial appeared to have prevented Group 2 
subjects from being able to use their advantage. 
The random shapes used were scaled for difficulty, 
but the various difficulty indices did not correlate 
highly with the measures of association value used by 
Vanderplas & Garvin (1959). The experimental paradigm 
was found to be less than optimal for the study of 
recognition memory, primarily because of ceiling effects 
that could not be eliminated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Much attention has been focused recently on the 
effects of organization on learning and memory. The 
impetus for this renewed interest in grouping processes 
was given, for the most part, by Miller's (1956) article 
concerning chunking. He reviewed evidence that suggested 
a limit on processing capacity which allowed input of 
only 7±2 chunks of information at a given time. Memory 
was increased, he argued, only by increasing the number 
of items in each chunk. 
A somewhat earlier treatment of grouping effects 
(Katona, 1940) gave a more detailed analysis of the 
process. "Artificial grouping" and "grouping by arrange- 
ment" were the two types of organization that occurred, 
with each type having its own rules. For artificial 
grouping, in which the subject arbitrarily groups the 
material to be learned, Katona listed the following 
rules: "(1) Between members of the same group there is 
a stronger association than between members of different 
groups, (2) part of a group has a tendency to reproduce 
the entire group, (3) groups have their own associations, 
which may be different from the associations of their 
members, and (4) grouping facilitates learning" (pp. 168- 
169). Furthermore, once groups were established, any 
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later situation which entailed re-grouping tended to 
subtract from the positive influence of prior use of the 
same materials. Recent evidence on this point appeared 
in a study hy Postman (1971) in which organization 
developed during a free recall task interfered v/ith later 
learning of a paired-associates task that paired the same 
words arbitrarily. 
Grouping according to an arrangement referred to 
situations where the grouping was obvious due to the 
nature of the material or was urged by the experimenter. 
This type of grouping tended to proceed faster than 
artificial grouping, and the boundaries between groups 
were stronger. These groups from an arrangement were 
more difficult for the subject to alter or discard than 
groups formed artificially. 
Mandler built upon the ideas of Katona and Miller 
in his theories of chunking. Mandler (1962) argued that 
functional response units were formed during overlearning, ■ 
after errors had dropped out, from what were previously 
discrete responses. "The whole sequence is elicited as 
a unit and behaves as a single component response has in 
the past; any part of it elicits the whole sequence" 
(p. 417). 
Mandler (1967) further argued that organization 
is necessary for learning to occur, that memory for verbal 
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materials is hierarchical (words are organized into 
successively higher-order categories), that within a 
category storage capacity is limited, and that the limit 
on memory is a function of how many hierarchical levels 
the subject can retain. Mandler (1968), however, set 
the processing limit at 5i2 chunks per hierarchical 
level, lower than Miller1s (1956) 7±2. 
A comprehensive treatment of chunking and recall by 
Johnson (1970) essentially agreed with Mandler's analysis, 
except for the substitution of 4±1 chunks as the processing 
capacity. He referred to memory codes, the "memorial 
representation of information" (p. 173), which were 
distinct from the information they represented. A chunk 
was defined as any response sequence which was represented 
by a single code. The code contained all the information 
in the chunk, and recall of the information depended 
on recovery of the code. These codes could be organized 
into higher-order units, which also contain all the 
information subsumed one level below them. Johnson (1970) 
referred to codes as "opaque containers," stressing 
that "a coded chunk cannot be considered as a collection 
of items in memory, but rather as a unitary entity within 
which item identity is lost" (p. 213). In several 
experiments, Johnson demonstrated that the probability 
of a complete omission of a chunk increased when more 
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chunks were used for a response sequence of fixed length. 
Adding more items per chunk failed to produce similar 
complete omissions, indicating that the chunks were 
recalled in an "all-or-none" fashion. 
Tulving (1968a) also conceded organization an 
important role in learning, and even implied that items 
must be organized before they can enter secondary memory. 
He claimed that organization has its effect on retrieval, 
in the form of a "retrieval plan" which makes items more 
accessible in memory. Johnson (1970) mentioned that 
his "opaque code" and Tulving1s "retrieval plan" probably 
referred to the same thing. The code content could be 
a type of locating system (a "set of ordered addresses") 
for recalling the items in the chunk. 
Postman (1972) basically agreed with the reasoning 
of Mandler and Tulving, but considered their statements 
that organization is necessary for learning as too extreme, 
He referred to such statements as being representative 
of the "strong principle of limited capacity." A "weak" 
principle holds that there is, indeed, a limit to the 
amount of information that can be processed during a 
specified period of time, but repetition may have effects 
apart from contributions to organization. Postman (1972) 
concluded that 
the weak principle of limited capacity constitutes 
an important argument for the functional utility 
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of organizational processes. There is good evidence 
that unitization can help to overcome the inherent 
limitations of the memory system, whatever they 
may be. No compelling evidence has been adduced, 
however, that the limits are such as to make 
unitization a necessary, and the only sufficient, 
condition for the retention of materials exceeding 
in length the span of immediate memory. Adoption 
of the strong principle of limited capacity places 
an unnecessary burden of proof on the organization 
theorist (p. 10). 
Both Tulvlng's retrieval plans and Johnson's opaque 
code theories required that the retrieval or code 
information be established during learning. If so, it 
would follow that any boost to recall of the code would 
enhance overall recall. Experimental manipulation of 
retrieval cues usually indicated better recall when cues 
were given (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Tulving & Osier, 
1968). The cues were either category names or weak 
associates of the to-be-remembered (TBR) words. Since 
overall recall of organized material depended on the 
number of categories recalled, with the number of items 
remembered per category rather constant regardless of the 
size of the category (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966), 
the category cues made it likely that few categories 
would be entirely omitted. There appeared to be "two 
independent retrieval processes, one concerned with the 
accessibility of higher-order memory units, the other 
with accessibility of items within higher-order memory 
units" (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Retrieval of the 
higher order units evidently represented the prime chore 
for memory. Johnson (1970) even argued that the prob- 
ability of retrieving a memory code was a function of the 
level of that code in the hierarchy, rather than being 
a function of the number of items the code represented. 
He gave some empirical evidence that higher order chunking 
led to more omissions of material in recall than lower 
order chunking of the same material (1970). 
lewis (1971) found facilitation with cueing by 
exemplars of categories when block presentation of items 
was employed, but not with random presentation. It 
seemed that blocked presentation of items led subjects 
to organize the material such that the cues given fit 
in with their organization scheme. The Tulving & Osier 
(1968) data were consistent with such an explanation, 
since it was found that cues had to be present at input 
and retrieval to be effective, while cues only at retrieval 
failed to be facilitative.  In the Lewis (1971) study, 
random presentation of items produced equal recall for 
cued and noncued groups, though cued groups recalled 
more categories, but fewer items per category, and 
noncued groups recalled fewer categories, but more items 
per category. Thus, cues did not aid and even disrupted 
groups given random presentation, since the initial 
storage was not amenable to the cues given. 
The evidence for facilitation of recall by giving 
cues indicated that items could be stored in memory 
even though they were not "recallable."    Tulving & 
Pearlstone  (1966)  referred to such items as being 
"available."    Recallable items were called "accessible" 
items.     Such a distinction for recall tests seems quite 
reasonable and helpful.     Does recognition memory operate 
the same way?    Is there retrieval in recognition memory? 
If so,  does organization affect recognition memory? 
Convincing answers to these questions are not yet 
available  (much less, accessible), though some evidence 
has begun to give some cues. 
Until recently,  the prevailing idea was that the 
recognition process required no retrieval phase, and was 
consequently not affected by organizational factors 
(Bartlett,   1932;   Kintsch,   1968; McGormack,   1972).     Support 
for such a notion came from both experimental evidence 
and intuitive appeal.    The superiority of recognition 
over recall scores, which was almost always found 
(Postman & Rau,   1957)  suggested the existence of some 
process necessary for recall, but not for recognition. 
This process was assumed to be retrieval.    Kintsch (1970) 
believed that 
in recognition,   the problem of retrieval is simple: 
the item is sensorily present and it is a simple 
matter to retrieve its corresponding representation 
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in memory (although how this is done is by no means 
obvious); the subject then has some means of judging 
the newness of the trace (response strength, 
familiarity); if the newness satisfies some criterion, 
the subject says he recognizes the item; otherwise, 
he calls it new; irrelevant alternatives are not 
considered in this judgment (p. 337). 
McNulty (1966) and Murdock (1963) believed that in 
some types of recognition test alternatives were not 
only relevant, but the primary foundation of the subject's 
strategy. In a recognition test the subject eliminates 
incorrect alternatives and then selects from the remaining 
items in a somewhat random fashion. McNulty (1966) 
also mentioned other possible explanations for the 
generally found superiority of recognition over recall: 
(1) There are usually fewer alternatives from which 
to choose in the recognition test, (2) In a recognition 
test a decision can be made on the basis of "partial" 
learning of stimulus items, while partial learning is 
less effective for recall. 
Babrick & Eahrick (1964), however, found that they 
could obtain scores for recognition tests which were 
either higher or lower than scores for recall tests. 
The subjects' task was to remember the position of a 
dot in a complex matrix. The experimenters contended 
that previous studies of various measures of retention 
(Postman and Rau, 1957; Luh, 1922) had used tests which 
were too easy, allowing simple differentiation of correct 
and incorrect alternatives. Thus, recognition and recall 
may be more similar than they were previously believed 
to be, 
The strongest case for effects of organization on 
recognition was presented by Mandler (1972). Putting 
the problem in historical perspective, he said that 
five years ago the problem of recognition and 
organization seemed to be relatively simple and 
we entered on what we thought would be a series 
of minor experiments to demonstrate what was then 
conventional wisdom and what is still accepted as 
a plausible position (e.g., Kintsch, 1970; Murdock, 
1968). Specifically it is assumed that while recall 
depends on the retrieval of items by means of 
organization of storage, recognition does not. 
We believed then, as apparently everybody else 
did too, that subjects would not use retrieval 
systems during recognition, whether the task 
presented them with organized or with unstructured 
lists of items. What was presumably the case was 
that we were dealing with two distinct processes 
in memory — a retrieval process and a decision 
process. Recognition depended — by that argument — 
solely on a simple decision process unaffected by 
organizational variables (1972, pp. 140-141). 
Mandler*s search for a simple way to distinguish 
recall and recognition led to the realization that a 
simple distinction was not possible (Mandler, Pearlstone, 
& Koopmans, 1969). Recognition was greater for more 
organized material (with organization defined as the 
number of categories used in a sorting task). It was 
suggested that studies not finding effects of organization 
often used insufficient degrees of organization for the 
effects to occur. 
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After reviewing the evidence and conducting several 
experiments on recognition and organization, Mandler 
concluded that 
the present data suggest that subjects may first 
check occurrence tags and then use organizational 
tests on those items that have weak tags. The 
more such uncertain items are generated, the better 
the correlation should be between the organization 
and recognition. This particular analysis of the 
situation also explains a previously puzzling finding, 
namely that the correlation between recognition and 
organization was higher after a two-week delay 
than during an immediate recognition test. List 
tags presumably decay markedly over two weeks and 
more items are thrown into the category of weak 
or uncertain items (1972, pp. 152-153). 
Mandler (1972) mentioned several studies which supported 
the notion that organization affects recognition. Lachman 
& Tuttle (1965), using syntax as the basis for a high 
degree of organization, found better recognition for 
organized than for unorganized items. Using random and 
hierarchically organized lists, Bower, Clark, Lesgold, 
& Winzenz (1969) found recognition scores higher for 
groups using organized lists. Bruce & Pagan (1970) 
varied the number of categories in a 42 word list. 
Recognition was better for groups using 6 categories 
than for groups using 42 categories. 
Other evidence concerning organization and recognition 
has come from studies employing random and blocked 
presentation of items prior to tests of memory. Kintsch 
(1968) found no facilitation of recognition performance 
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after blocked presentation (relative to random presentation) 
but his experiments have been criticized by Postman (1972) 
and by D'Agostino (1969). D'Agostino replicated Kintsch's 
(1968) experiment, using better controls, and found a 
slightly significant effect of blocked presentation. 
Jacoby (1972) determined that the effect of type 
of presentation depended somewhat on the order of items 
on the recognition test. In his first experiment, there 
was a significant interaction between the type of training 
(blocked vs. random) and the type of test (categorized- 
ordered vs. categorized unordered vs. uncategorized), 
Thus, the facilitation due to the ordering of items on 
the recognition test in a manner similar to that during 
initial learning was greater for more highly organized 
lists (blocked presentation). In the second experiment, 
blocked presentation was superior to random presentation 
and a categorized-ordered test was superior to an uncateg- 
orized test, but the interaction failed to reach 
significance. Jacoby (1972) concluded that 
organization variables do have an effect on 
recognition memory. The conditions under which 
an effect should be expected, however, have not 
been completely determined . . .Conflicting results 
from investigations of organization effects on 
recognition may be partially due to differences 
in degree and ease of organization. Degree or 
organization probably depends on category size, 
the particular categories employed, the normative 
frequency of study words as category instances, 
S's strategy and a number of other unspecified 
variables (pp. 330-331). 
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In addition, Jacoby (1972) mentioned that the 
distance (lag) between related items in a randomized 
list would affect the ease and, hence, the degree of 
organization. Jacoby & Hendricks (1973) spaced category 
instances 0, 1, 3, or 11 items apart and found significant- 
ly greater recognition memory for the first two groups 
over the last two groups. Apparently, the separation 
of category instances made organization more difficult. 
Categorized tests yielded significantly higher recognition 
scores than did uncategorized tests (though with greater 
spacing, this superiority was reduced or lost completely). 
The false alarm rate increased with spacing, indicating 
that some category information was encoded even with 
greater spacing, though this information was not sufficient 
for discrimination of "old" and "new" items. The experi- 
menters contended that their results were in accord with 
Mandler's (1972) suggestion that retrieval is involved 
in recognition memory only when items are highly 
organized during study, with low degrees of organization 
sometimes disrupting recognition performance. 
There is some evidence that the context of a test 
item (either items that accompany it at presentation or 
the general structure of the list) determines how that 
item will be stored in memory. Context effects have 
been shown to be important for recognition memory. 
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Tulving &  Thomson (1971) changed context by adding, 
deleting, or changing a "context word" (a word that 
accompanied the teat item) during the recognition teat. 
Any auch change in the context was found to be detrimental 
to performancef    Evidently, only location of the specific 
encoding of an item, which waa affected (determined) 
by ita context, allowed correct recognition. Thus, 
differencea in context between first presentation of an 
item and later presentation of the item tended to produce 
different and independent functional stimuli, while the 
nominal stimulus (the teat item itself) remained unchanged. 
Tulving &  Thompson (1971) believed that information had 
to be available and accessible for recognition as well 
as recall. 
Light & Carter-Sobell (1970) found higher recognition 
performance when the meaning of homographs (adjective- 
noun pairs in which the adjective tenda to determine 
which meaning of the noun ia used) was the same during 
study and test, indicating that context information was 
stored at input which aided retrieval when it waa preserved 
at output.  They argued that proponenta of theories of 
recognition memory who contend that recognition requires 
only a deciaion concerning the familiarity of an item 
ahould add aome mechanism which can specify the particular 
memory representation that would be examined for recency. 
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"It is clearly not sufficient to simply state that 
presentation of a test item obviates the need for retrieval 
operations by directing S to the memory representation 
of a test item for purposes of making recency judgments" 
(Light & Carter-Sobell, 1970, p. 9). 
Winograd, Karchmer, & Russell (1971) found a "cueing 
effect, defined as the facilitation of recognition of a 
to-be-remembered (TBR) word by the reinstatement of an 
item which accompanied it at encoding" (p. 199). This 
cueing effect was found only when subjects were instructed 
to form a compound image (a "bizarre mental picture 
combining the words" (p. 201)), and not when they were 
given associative instructions. Winograd et al. (1971) 
argued that a "compound image was stored as a functional 
unit, with each part undoubtedly altered by its incorpora- 
tion into that whole . . . With associative instructions, 
we must assume that what is stored is something like 
separate elements along with information that they go 
together" (p. 204). Although a cueing effect was found 
with associative instructions for recall, while not for 
recognition, it is likely that the difference was due to 
the amount of "cueing" in the "uncued recognition test." 
In other words, presentation of the TBR word on the 
recognition test was more of a cue than none at all, 
which was the case on the recall test. 
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In the same vein, Tulving (1968b) used compound 
words (such as tooth-ache) during learning and tested 
for recognition only one word of the pair. The decrement 
in scores found was presumably due to breaking up the 
encoded unit, an explanation which Winograd et.al. 
(1971) would find agreeable. DaPolito, Barker, & Wiant 
(1971) studied retrieval processes in recognition memory 
similarly by altering the context of the item. Semantical- 
ly related word triplets were presented, then one of the 
words was presented for recognition either in the original 
context, with no context (words deleted), with new, related 
context words which suggested a different meaning for the 
target word, or with unrelated context words. Using hit 
rate as a measure of recognition performance, the old 
context condition produced the highest scores, and the 
new unrelated context condition the worst. The deleted 
and new related conditions were intermediate and did not 
differ significantly from each other. Using a signal 
detection theory (SDT) application, however, the best 
groups were the old context and new related context groups, 
while the worst were the deleted and new unrelated groups. 
DaPolito et al. (1971) argued that the SDT method was 
probably more accurate, since it controlled for decision 
criterion changes. That the new related items did not 
hinder recognition performance was at odds with the 
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Light & Carter-Sobell (1970) results. Instead, the 
results in the DaPolito et al. study suggested that 
during recognition tjsts, a specific semantic context 
permits S to retrieve multiple semantic representa- 
tions for a single word, especially if the representa- 
tions are strongly coupled in associative memory. 
Although all internal representations may not be 
searched, the multiple retrieval hypothesis seems 
more than a logical possibility, since associative 
responses to equivocal words depend upon comparisons 
of different meanings (1970, p. 181). 
The deleted and new unrelated groups were, however, 
hindered on the recognition test, which indicated inter- 
ference (or lack of facilitation) due to changed context. 
Light & Schurr (1973) incorporated the techniques 
of Tulving &  Thomson (1971) and Winograd et, al. (1971) 
in a recent study of context effects in recognition memory. 
Groups learned a list of unrelated words either by (1) 
inventing a story which preserved input order for blocks 
of eight words, (2) studying the list grouped into blocks 
of eight, or (3) studying the items singly. The "story" 
group performed better on the recognition test than the 
other two groups, which did not differ. Performance on 
a recognition test which preserved input order was better 
than on a test which had different order. However, the 
prediction that this superiority would be greatest for 
the "story" group (since it was presumably the most 
highly unitized) was not confirmed, thus arguing against 
the unitization hypothesis (Winograd et al., 1971) which 
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would predict a greater effect of changed context for more 
highly unitized materials. Subjects performed better 
for tests with order similar to input order in both the 
"story" and the "single" groups, indicating that the 
"hypothesis that context affects recognition performance 
may thus be extended from the 2-word context situation 
investigated by Tulving and Thomson (1971) to the more 
general case in which the entire list in which a word 
is embedded is viewed as its context" (light &  Schurr, 
1973, p. 138). 
The present study examined the effects of organization 
and cueing on recognition memory for random shapes. 
Random shapes were used for several reasons. First, they 
were considered less likely than words or letters to 
be affected by preexperimental associations, although 
some of the shapes were expected, upon exposure to the 
subjects, to evoke consistent associations across subjects. 
Secondly, interference effects during the retention 
interval were expected to be minimal, since few subjects 
were likely to encounter similar random shapes elsewhere 
during the week. Third, it was hoped that complex random 
shapes would be difficult to remember for a week and 
ceiling effects on the recognition test would be avoided. 
Fourth, the recent technique used by Charles Richman and 
his associates (Richman & Trinder, 1968; Trinder, Richman, 
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& Gulkin,   1969;  Trinder, Metzger,  Sherman, and Ricnman, 
1972;  Ricnman,  Bidwell,  & Benson,  1973; Ricnman,  1974) 
for inducing chunking with random shapes could he used 
to study the effects of experimentally acquired-organiza- 
tion on recognition memory.    Their method of evoking 
organization with these  shapes was used rather uniformly 
in all of their studies, and will he hriefly described. 
In general,   subjects learned to give one response (in 
some cases a verbal response;   in others, a lever press) 
to four random shapes and another response to four others. 
After the subjects had been either undertrained or over- 
trained on the discrimination task,  they were given 
either a reversal or a nonreversal shift.     In the reversal 
shift,  all Response "A"  shapes became Response  "B" shapes, 
and Response "B" shapes became MA" shapes.    Thus all four 
shapes in each response group were still united by having 
one response in common, but the responses were now 
switched between groups.     In the nonreversal shift, 
responses for only two shapes in each response group were 
changed (two A's and two B»s).     Thus,  the original groups 
(A and B) were now broken up.     It was hypothesized that 
prior to reaching criterion,  subjects responded in an 
S-R fashion to each individual shape, and had not yet 
firmly organized the shapes into groups according to 
common responses.    After overtraining, however,   two 
chunks should have formed, with the shapes having the 
same label forming the chunks. Evidence for chunking 
was obtained by comparing the two types of shift. As 
expected, the undertrained group performed better on the 
nonreversal shift, since subjects responding on an 
S-R basis for each individual shape would benefit from 
the smaller number of response changes in the nonreversal 
shift (4 as compared to 8 in the reversal). With over- 
training, however, subjects performed better on the 
reversal shift, indicating that the chunks were well 
integrated and that all the subjects had to do was to 
switch chunk labels. On the nonreversal shift, the 
chunks were disrupted and relearning was not facilitated 
by having the items highly organized. 
Given that a common response can lead to grouping 
of random shapes, the effects of such grouping on memory 
can be assessed. Predictions concerning the effects of 
chunking on memory for random shapes should parallel 
those for verbal materials. Specifically, if the number 
of categories (chunks of random shapes, as defined by 
having a common response) is varied for a constant number 
of shapes, memory should be better when an optimal number 
of categories and items per category is used. In the 
present study, it is predicted that two categories with 
five items per category (Group 2) should be better 
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than ten categories with one item per category (Group 10). 
As is probably obvious, random shapes do not readily 
lend themselves to the recall paradigm. Therefore, a 
recognition test is used.  If the predicted superiority 
of Group 2 over Group 10 is found, it constitutes evidence 
for the effect of organizational processes, and thus 
retrieval processes, in recognition memory. In addition, 
cueing effects are examined by constructing different 
types of recognition test. Tests with retrieval cues 
are expected to yield higher recognition performance 
than those with no cueing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Forty students taking introductory psychology courses 
at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro during 
the spring of 1974 were used as subjects. 
Apparatus 
A total of thirty 24-point random shapes (Vanderplas 
& Garvin, 1959) were used in the experiment. Ten of the 
shapes were randomly selected from this pool and used 
as test items. The remainder were used as the distractor 
shapes on the recognition test. The test shapes were rear- 
projected by a Kodak Carousel 800 projector, which was 
controlled by solid state equipment, onto a translucent 
screen.  The projected size of each shape was approximately 
six inches high and eight inches wide. The subject 
sat 3 feet on the far side of the screen. A small metal 
box containing red feedback lights was fastened to the 
table on which the screen rested. 
For the recognition test, 5 test and 10 distractor 
shapes were printed on each of two cards, with the shapes 
on each card in a single column. The shapes on each 
card were lettered sequentially from top to bottom with 
the letters A-0 appearing to the left of the shapes. 
The cards were 11 inches long and 4 inches wide. Responses 
by subjects were written on an answer sheet like the one 
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shown in Figure 1. 
Procedure 
There were two conditions of original learning 
and two types of recognition test in the 2x2 factorial 
design.  In the learning task, 20 subjects used the 
numbers "1" and "2" to label the 10 shapes (Group 2) 
and 20 subjects used the numbers "1-10" (Group 10). 
Group 2 subjects thus responded to 5 shapes with "1" 
and the other 5 shapes with "2". Shapes having the 
same response will be referred to as being in the same 
"category".  Subjects were read the following instructions: 
I am going to project 10 shapes on the screen in 
front of you, one at a time.  I have assigned a 
number to each shape and you will try to learn, 
initially through guessing, what number goes with 
each shape. Use the numbers 1-10 for the 10 shapes 
(for Group 2 subjects: Use the numbers 1 and 2 
to label the 10 shapes. Thus there will be 5 shapes 
you call 1 and 5 you call 2). A shape will be 
shown for 7 seconds. While it is being shown, 
please call out the number you think goes with it. 
Please speak loudly and distinctly, so I can be 
sure what number you are saying. Call out only 
one number for each shape presentation. If you 
are correct, the two red lights on the box in front 
of you will light up. We will continue until you 
get all 10 shapes correct 3 times in a row. Do you 
have any questions? 
There was an interval of 3 seconds between shapes and a 
13 second interval between the blocks of 10 shapes. 
Six different random orders of shape presentation were 
used with each subject. All subjects learned to a 
criterion of three successive correct trials. 
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Pig. 1• Sample recognition test form. 
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One week after completion of the learning task, the 
appropriate recognition test was administered. The two 
types of test will be referred to as "categorized" and 
"uncategorized". The categorized test for Group 10 
had the test shapes in sequential order, according to 
the response number used in the learning task. Thus, 
on Card 1, the first test shape encountered was the 
shape to which the subject responded "1", the next test 
shape encountered was "2", and so on through shape "5". 
On Card 2, test shapes 6-10 appeared, also in order. 
For Group 2 subjects, the same cards were used. 
Shapes "1" through "5", however, were those which Group 
2 subjects called "1" in the learning task, and shapes 
w6n through "10" were those called "2" in the learning 
task. Thus, the "categorization" in each card for Group 2 
subjects was based on a common response to all of the 
test shapes on that card, while the "categorization" 
for Group 10 subjects referred to sequential ordering. 
For the uncategorized test, test shapes were assigned 
to the two cards randomly, thus mixing the categories 
for Group 2 subjects and scrambling the sequence for 
Group 10 subjects. The position of test shapes within 
the columns was determined randomly, and was the same 
for both forms of the recognition test. Each distractor 
shape was in exactly the same location on both test forms. 
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Thus, the assignment of different test shapes to fixed 
test shape positions within the columns constituted the 
only difference between recognition tests. 
When the recognition test was given, subjects were 
told that they were to pick out 5 shapes from each card 
that they had seen before, indicate their confidence in 
their choices by using the 5-point scale on the answer 
sheet, and try to remember the number they previously 
paired with each shape.  Subjects taking the categorized 
test were informed that the test was categorized. Thus, 
Group 2 subjects were told that all test shapes appearing 
on Card 1 had "1w as a response term in the learning 
task, and all test shapes on Card 2 had "2" as a response 
term. Group 10 subjects were told that the test shapes 
were arranged sequentially according to the number with 
which they previously had been paired. For these cued 
conditions, the columns on the answer sheet headed by 
"Response Number" were already filled in (by the experi- 
menter) with the appropriate numbers.  Subjects taking 
the uncategorized recognition test were not given any 
such retrieval cues. 
To fill out the answer sheet, subjects were told 
to write the letter that appeared next to each shape 
they chose (as one they had seen before) in the appropriate 
blanks on the answer sheet ~ under the heading "Shape". 
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Then, they were to look at the confidence scale, select 
a number from the scale which indicated their degree of 
confidence that they had actually seen each chosen shape 
before, and place that number under the heading "Confidence 
Number" opposite the corresponding shape letter (the 
letter used to designate the shape). Then, subjects 
were to write the numbers they thought were previously 
paired with each shape in the column headed "Response 
Number." After completing this process for Card 1, 
subjects repeated the process for Card 2. 
After the recognition test had been completed, the 
experimenter discussed the design of the experiment 
with the subject, and asked what types of strategies the 
subject had used. Subjects in cued conditions were 
asked if they thought the cueing helped, and subjects 
in non-cued conditions were asked if cueing probably 
would have helped them. Some of the subjects were asked 
for the specific associations they had used to remember 
each shape, and whether they had memorized only a specific 
portion of the shape instead of the entire shape. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Learning data, recognition data, and shape difficulty 
information were analyzed separately, except where an 
aspect of one type of data was examined for its effect 
on some aspect of another type of data. The analysis 
of the learning began with a comparison of Group 2 and 
Group 10 on the standard measure "trials to criterion," 
Group 2 subjects took an average of 14.9 trials to reach 
criterion (S.D.=4.74), while Group 10 subjects took an 
average of 16.5 trials (S.D.=4.18). A t test indicated 
that the two groups did not differ significantly on this 
measure (t=1.1, df=38), assuring that later comparison 
of recognition scores of the two groups was not biased 
by differential frequency of exposure to the random 
shapes. The lack of a difference between these groups 
on the average trials required to reach criterion was 
simultaneously encouraging (since the recognition scores 
could confidently be compared) and puzzling, since there 
seemed to be reasons to expect the groups to differ on 
this measure. The primary difference between the two 
groups concerned the role of chance performance.  Since 
chance performance for Group 2 subjects was 50#, while 
chance performance for Group 10 subjects was, at first, 
1055 and declined to 1 of 9, 1 of 8, and so on as shapes 
were learned, it seemed that Group 2 subjects would learn 
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faster because they got more shapes correct by chance 
and thus had more opportunity to learn the shapes in the 
early trials. Furthermore, Group 2 subjects could learn 
a shape even when they were wrong on a particular trial, 
since there were only two response possibilities. 
The learning patterns for the two groups were found 
to be different, due largely to the different chance 
performance levels. The learning data for each subject 
consisted of ten separate learning curves for each of 
the ten shapes (see Figure 2). These ten curves were 
aligned at the trial of last error for each subject, to 
allow a better representation of actual performance 
prior to learning. When aligned in this manner, curves 
for some shapes were longer (covered more trials) than 
curves for other shapes, which would make overall curves 
for each subject misleading if they were drawn using 
"number of shapes correct" as the ordinate. Therefore, 
the proportion correct on each trial prior to the aligned 
trial of last error was used to draw adjusted learning 
curves for each subject. Adjusted curves for Group 2 
are shown in Figure 3 and adjusted curves for Group 10 
are shown in Figure 4. Curves characteristically began 
between 40# and 50# for Group 2 subjects and then 
progressed erratically to criterion. Group 10 subjects 
started near the chance level of 10* and advanced to 
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Fig.   4.    Adjusted learning curves for the 20 
subjects in Group 10. C=correct and I=incorrect. 
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criterion in a manner more indicative of one trial learning 
of the individual shapes.  To explain such different 
patterns, along with the question concerning the unexpected 
similarity in learning speed of the two groups, the 
concept of memory overload had to be invoked. It appeared 
that Group 10 subjects, who rarely guessed correctly 
more than two random shapes on a given trial, were able 
to remember whatever shapes they did get correct. A 
Group 2 subject, however, was often faced with the chal- 
lenge of remembering five shapes at once, and even 
attempting to remember all shapes on each trial, since 
negative feedback is fully informative for this group. 
Since the overload was purported to have occurred for 
Group 2 subjects and not for Group 10 subjects, some 
index had to be devised which would believably measure 
overload and would differ for the two groups. Since 
it seemed logical that subjects who learned faster may 
have done so because of a greater ability to process 
and store information (i.e., a greater channel capacity), 
the measure of capacity should correlate inversely with 
trials to criterion. The correlation should be higher 
for Group 2 subjects than for Group 10 subjects, since 
the measure of capacity for Group 2 subjects was more 
valid (since they were presumably more likely to have 
been overloaded with information). The devised index, 
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v/hich will be called the "spread index", was computed 
as follows. Subjects within each group were arranged 
in rank order according to number of trials to criterion, 
with subjects having fewer trials to criterion (fast 
learners) first. Then the original learning curves for 
each subject were analysed to determine when each shape 
was learned (as indicated by the trial of last error). 
A frequency distribution was constructed, giving the 
number of shapes learned on each trial (see Figure 5). 
Trials upon which no shape was learned were deleted from 
the frequency distributions for each subject. The 
physical height, or number of items in the column, was 
representative of the "spread" of actual learning of the 
shapes over the entire learning process for each subject. 
In other words, a short distribution would indicate that 
the subject learned several shapes on the same trial, 
and probably did this more than once. The learning of 
several shapes on the same trial indicated a large 
processing capacity, since the information was all 
stored in close temporal proximity. On the other hand, 
if only one or two shapes were learned on each trial, 
processing capacity appeared limited. The length of the 
distribution was conceptually independent of the number 
of trials to criterion, since several shapes could be 
learned on the same trial anywhere in the learning process. 
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Thus the link between trials to criterion and the spread 
index is theoretical, and not a mathematical inevitability. 
The Pearson correlations performed were attempts to 
measure the relationship between trials to criterion 
(speed of learning) and the spread index for each group. 
The Pearson correlation for Group 2 was .779 (df=18, p<.01) 
while that for Group 10 was .502 (df=18, p<.05). Thus, 
the hypothesis concerning processing and memory capacity 
was supported. The lack of difference between the two 
groups in trials to criterion can be understood as due 
to the inability of Group 2 subjects to take full 
advantage of the more abundant information afforded them, 
with the inability presumably due to a limit on the 
amount of information that they could process at a given 
time.  Scatter plots showing the relationship between 
the spread index and trials to criterion appear in 
Figure 6. 
Overall learning curves were constructed for each 
group by a quasi-Vincentizing procedure. The adjusted 
learning curves for each subject were examined and the 
number of correct responses per trial was recorded. 
These numbers were each divided by the number of shapes 
which actually were represented by learning curves on 
each trial. The resulting index indicated the proportion 
correct for each trial. These indicee were listed for 
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each subject, with the subjects being ordered according 
to trials to criterion. Then the entire display of 
indices was divided into fifths such that approximately 
one-fifth of each subject's learning curve was collapsed 
with the corresponding fifth of other subjects* learning 
curves, as in Figure 7. The overall curves were then 
plotted as the average proportions for each of the five 
divisions, as shown in Figure 8. Upon examination of 
the curves in Figure 8, it appeared that both groups 
performed at their respective chance levels of performance 
until just prior to criterion, at which time they improved 
to comparable levels above chance (approximately 10# 
for each group). The assumption of one-trial learning 
of the shapes would not quite fit with the rise to above 
chance performance before the shapes are learned. However, 
the one trial theory probably holds up when the nature 
of the adjusted learning curves is examined. It will 
be remembered that the adjusted learning curves represented 
only the data for each shape that preceded the trial of 
last error, on the assumption that the shape had not 
been learned prior to that time. Certain types of 
response sequence, however, can falsely be included in 
the adjusted learning curves, in that the shape may have 
already been learned. For example, occasionally a subject 
would respond correctly to a particular shape for ten 
_p '  '        L,  A o 
Fig. 7. Illustration of the "quasi Vineentizing" procedure. 
Numbers are from the adjusted learning curves of the 20 Group 2 
subjects and represent the number of shapes the subject got correct 
divided by the number of shapes represented on each trial. The 
overall average fractions for each fifth of the display were used 
to draw Pig. 8. 
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trials in a row, then miss it once, and continue on 
getting it correct for the remainder of the experiment. 
The one incorrect response in such a case would more 
likely indicate a "slip of the tongue" or a temporary 
lack of concentration than an actual state of ignorance 
as to the proper response to the shape. When response 
sequences of this sort are included in the calculation 
of adjusted learning curve proportions, they tend to 
inflate the proportions to give the appearance of abov.e 
chance levels of performance. Yet it is probably the 
case that most of the shapes are learned in all-or-none 
fashion, especially for Group 10 subjects. 
Another way to describe the differences in learning 
patterns between the two groups was found in an analysis 
of the conditional probabilities of successive responses. 
This type of analysis also was initiated in an attempt 
to learn whether subjects in Group 2 could capitalize 
as easily on negative feedback, which by process of 
elimination gives the correct answer to the subject, 
as on positive feedback. The latter quest ran aground 
somewhat when it was realized that precise specification 
of the exact time of learning was impossible. It was 
not sufficient to assume that the shapes were "learned" 
ictly when they passed from the trial of last error exac 
to the next trial. It could have been that the shape 
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was answered correctly by chance on that trial and was 
actually learned on the trial or trials following the 
trial of last error.  Since the learning curves for each 
shape for each subject were not informative about the 
exact time of learning, and the conditional probabilities 
calculated were derived from analysis of these same curves, 
little confidence could be placed in the assumption 
that the conditional probability distributions could 
decide the relative helpfulness of positive and negative 
feedback to Group 2 subjects. 
The conditional distributions were helpful, however, 
in illustrating the difference in learning patterns 
between Group 2 and Group 10. The adjusted learning 
curves for each subject, which had been aligned by trials 
of last error, were analyzed and all successive pairs 
of responses were listed and summed to create distributions 
for the four possible combinations:  (1) right to right, 
(2) wrong to right, (3) right to wrong, and (4) wrong 
to wrong.  Thus, for each subject a 2x2 matrix was created 
which showed the total number of instances which fell 
into each of the four categories. The totals in each 
cell were then converted to percentages for each subject, 
and these cell percentages were used to calculate mean 
cell percentages for Group 2 and Group 10 independently. 
The conditional distributions are shown in Figure 9. 
42 
:) 
■ 
1004 
90 
80- 
_   6* 
Z 
ui o soi 
at 
m 
JL 
40 
30 
2(H 
10 
R-R   R-W W-R W-W 
GROUP   2 
R-R   RW W-R  WW 
GROUP   10 
Pig.  9.     Conditional probabilities for the 
Toups.    R-R=right to right, R-W=right to 
',  W-R=wrong to right,  W-W=wrong to wrong. 
two gr -  
wrong
43 
The response sequences wrong-to-right and right- 
to-wrong comprised a larger proportion of all responses 
for Group 2 than for Group 10 subjects. Group 10 subjects 
tended to respond incorrectly until they finally got a 
shape correct, after which they continued to get it 
correct. The apparent "learning and unlearning*' of shapes 
for Group 2 subjects appeared to be a function of chance 
fluctuations only. In other words, correct responses 
for Group 10 subjects were more likely to be indicative 
of actual knowledge than correct responses for Group 2 
subjects, since the latter were more likely to have 
been a function of chance. The very high percentage of 
wrong-wrong responses for Group 10 subjects indicated 
what has been described before — these subjects responded 
incorrectly until they got the shape right, after which 
they often continued to get the shape right throughout 
the experiment. Since the process of aligning the learning 
curves for each shape by the trial of last error excludes 
the numerous right-right responses seen after the shape 
is learned, the percentage of right-right responses of 
Group 10 subjects is understandably low. 
The recognition data did not fulfill expectations, 
primarily because of unwanted ceiling effects that could 
not be eliminated. A 2x2 analysis of variance on the 
recognition scores of the four groups — categorized and 
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uncatcgorized by Group 2 and Group 10 — revealed 
significant main effects for number of responses 
(F=4.52, df=1,36, p<.05) and a significant interaction 
(P=6.78, df=1,36, p<.05)». as summarized in Table 1. 
Scheffe tests on all possible combinations of the four 
cell means were significant for the following comparisons: 
Group 2C vs. Group 10C, Group 2C vs. Groups 100 and 10U 
combined, Group 20 vs. Group 100 and Group 2U combined, 
and Group 20 vs. Group 100, Group 10U, and Group 2U 
combined (P=11.19, 9.55, 10.78, and 9.86 respectively, 
df=3,36, p<.05). The cell means for these four groups 
are shown in Figure 10. 
GROUP 2 
CATEGORIZED 
UNCATEGORIZED 95# 
GROUP 10 
985* 
9455 
Pig. 10. Recognition performance for the 
four recognition groups. 
The main cause of the significant differences was obviously 
the difference between the 88# correct recognitions of 
Group 20 and the 98# correct recognitions by Group 100. 
It must be remembered that the "categorization" was 
different for the two groups, with response number 
constituting the organization for Group 2 and serial 
position (1 through 10) for Group 10. It appeared that 
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TABLE 1 
2x2 Analysis of Variance for Recognition Scores 
Source of Calculations 
Variance SS df MS P P 
No. of 
response 
categ. 
2.02 1 2.02 4.52 <.05 
Categor- 
ization .22 1 .22 .49 
NS 
Inter- 
action 3.03 1 3.03 
6.78 <.05 
Error 16.10 36 .45 
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the serial position cue for Croup 10 subjects was a more 
effective cue than the category membership cue for 
Group 2 subjects. Some Group 10 subjects mentioned in 
the post-experimental interview that they were helped 
in situations where they could, for example, remember 
shapes 1 and 3  and then know where to search more specific- 
ally for shape 2. Since Group 20 was different from 
other groups only when Group 100 was included in the 
analysis, it would be inappropriate to state that Group 20 
subjects were actually hindered by the category cueing. 
Instead, the results indicated that Group 100 was different 
from Group 20 and not much else. The serial position 
cueing was helpful, but the response number category 
cueing was not. 
The confidence scores, which were indicative of the 
subjects' confidence that the shapes they listed on the 
answer sheet were the correct shapes, were not systematic- 
ally related to the actual recognition scores of the 
subjects, as indicated by a nonsignificant Pearson 
correlation between the confidence and recognition scores 
(r=.263, df=58). The lack of significance of this correla- 
tion should not be extremely surprising, since there 
was much opportunity for response bias to be much more 
different for subjects than the very homogeneous 
recognition scores. Some subjects reported extreme 
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confidence to the experimenter after the experiment, 
along with indicating the maximum degree of confidence 
on the answer sheet. Other subjects, however, verbally 
expressed an uncertainty that they had selected the 
correct shapes. These subjects tended to diverge widely 
in their interpretation of the confidence scale, some 
using the lowest point on the scale to indicate a degree 
of uncertainty which corresponded, according to verbal 
description, with degrees of confidence of other subjects 
who U3ed higher points on the scale. Often the subjects 
who recorded uncertainty scored perfectly on the recog- 
nition test. Evidently the measure of confidence as used 
in the present experiment was not a particularly valid 
measure. 
The random shapes used in the present study were all 
24-point shapes, yet they varied in difficulty of learning. 
Attempts were made to determine the difficulty of the 
various shapes, and the possible relationship of scaled 
psychological responses to the shapes with their 
difficulty. Three different measures of difficulty 
were used. First, the trial of last error was used, 
with the assumption that shapes learned first were easier 
than those whose trial of last error came later. This 
method probably yielded a more accurate measure of shape 
difficulty for Group 2 than for Group 10, since the 
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bias from which shapes were first guessed correctly was 
greater for the latter group.    The second and third 
measures of shape difficulty were devised to overcome 
the biasing effect of chance to more adequately guage 
the actual relative difficulty of the shapes.     One of 
the measures devised consisted entirely of trials between 
the first correct response for a shape and the trial 
following the trial of last error.    It was reasoned that 
longer intervals would signify more difficulty in learning 
the shape than would shorter intervals.    The shapes were 
put in rank order according to the size of these intervals. 
The interval sizes for each shape were averaged across 
all subjects in each of the two main groups (Group 2 
and Group 10).     This measure was, however,  likely to be 
insensitive to certain subtle types of response sequences 
which falsely indicated that a shape was difficult. 
There were two types of response sequence which were 
deceptive.     One type, which has already been discussed 
in the consideration of the adjusted learning curves, 
was characterized by a string of correct responses follow- 
ed by a single (or in some cases,   two)  incorrect response, 
and then a succession of correct responses that continued 
until the criterion was reached.     Such a pattern would 
have too large an interval index for the actual degree 
of difficulty suggested,   since the single incorrect 
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response more probably indicated a slip of the tongue 
or a momentary lapse of concentration on the subject's 
part. At the other extreme, subjects would sometimes 
get a shape correct initially, and then miss it for one, 
two, or three trials in a row before getting it correct 
for the remainder of the learning task. Adjustments 
were sought to keep such patterns from being added to 
the index of difficulty, since it was likely that the 
first correct response in this case was a chance occurrence 
and did not indicate that the subject had knowledge 
of the shape. When the number of trials containing 
errors following a correct response exceeded three, 
however, however, shape difficulty was assumed to be 
indicated (although this argument tends to be more valid 
for Group 2 than for Group 10, since in the latter case 
it was not as likely that the subject would again get 
the shape correct by chance in a small number of trials). 
Thus, a third index of difficulty was devised to adjust 
for these two specific types of response sequence. The 
proportion of the responses which were correct within 
the interval used for the second index was calculated 
for each shape and expressed in decimal form. A value 
of "1" was assigned to all instances where this proportion 
was greater than or equal to .19 and less than or equal 
to .81. When the numerator of a proportion was zero and 
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the denominator three or less, a value of "0" was assigned. 
When the numerator of the proportion was zero and the 
denominator exceeded three, a value of "1" was assigned. 
The "1" values were indicative of shape difficulty, and 
were summed for each shape across all subjects in Group 2 
and Group 10 independently. The ten shapes were then 
rank ordered according to the totals obtained. 
In addition to the measures of shape difficulty, 
the shapes were rank ordered according to three other 
measures, which were obtained by Vanderplas & Garvin 
(1959). The shapes were scaled on association value, 
proportion of content responses, and heterogeneity. 
The association value represented the percentage of all 
subjects questioned in their study who either gave an 
association to a shape or who indicated that the shape 
reminded them of something, though they did not verbalize 
it.  The proportion of casee in which actual responses 
were, given, instead of just saying "I had an association", 
was the "proportion content response" measure. The final 
measure indicated the degree to which responses varied 
for each shape across subjects. These three indices 
were used in the present study to determine whether they 
could help explain the relative difficulty of the shapes. 
Rank order correlations were calculated for all 
meaningful combinations of shape orderings, and the 
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correlations are listed in Figure 11. The correlations 
did not indicate strong relationships between shape 
difficulty and the association-type measures. Since 
only five out of twenty-seven correlations were significant 
and only two of these concerned the association measures, 
it appeared that prediction of shape difficulty would 
have to encompass other factors before becoming accurate. 
It did appear that Scheme A, the method in which certain 
misleading types of response sequence were eliminated, 
allowed the best determination of shape difficulty, 
especially for Group 10. That trial of last error was 
a confounded measure for Group 10 is evident when the 
correlation of Scheme A and Proportion Content Responses 
(.676) is compared to the correlation of Trial of last 
Error and Proportion Content Responses (.043). A similar 
comparison for Group 2 shows a greater agreement between 
the two measures, with the correlation for Scheme A 
and Proportion Content Responses being .530, and 
the correlation for Trial of Last Error and Proportion 
Content Responses being .285. The trial of last error 
for Group 10 subjects was, as expected, affected too 
much by the order in which the shapes were guessed. 
The three measures devised to ascertain shape 
difficulty agreed highly for Group 2, as indicated by 
the high correlations among these measures for that 
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SCHEME 
A 
TRIAL 
US  LAST 
ERROR 
LENGTH  ASSOC- 
OF mta,  IATION 
VAL   VALUE 
PROP.  HETERO- 
CONTENT GENEITY 
R»s 
SCHEME 
A \ 
.791 
-.02 7 
.882 
.524 
-.209 
.355 
.530 
.6 76 
.02 1 
.421 
TRIAI OP LAST 
ERROR 
.91 5 
.358 
.079 
.200 
.285 
.043 
.213 
.5 76 
LENGTH OF 
INTERVAL . 
.067 
.648 
.515 
.333 
.225 
.625 
ASSOCIATION 
VALUE \ \ 
.382 .527 
PROPORTION 
CONTENT 
RESPONSES \ \ 
.564 
HETERO- 
GENEITY 
\ \ 
Fig. 11. Rank order correlation matrix for shape 
difficulty measures and "association" scales. When two 
numbers are present, top is for Group 2 and other for 
Group 10. Critical values: p .05=.648, p .01=.794. 
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group, but did not seem to adequately measure the same 
thing for Group 10 subjects. The lack of agreement for 
Group 10 was most likely attributable to the inadequacy 
of the Trial of Last Error and the Length of Interval 
measures for this group. The Length of Interval measure 
was not adequate because, for many shapes in Group 10, 
it was often zero. In other words, many shapes were 
learned in one trial and thus were not easily distinguished 
in terms of ease of learning. The Scheme A approach 
also suffered from the presence of such one-trial learning, 
but was more useful because it eliminated the two types 
of misleading response sequence which appeared mainly for 
Group 10. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The recognition test data were disappointing, in 
that unwanted, but seemingly uncorrectable, ceiling effects 
appeared to preclude the appearance of a meaningful 
pattern of results. The ceiling effects could have been 
avoided, of course, if delays of four weeks instead of 
one week were used. However, such delays would presumably 
nullify the possibility for cueing effects, since the 
numbers associated with the shapes, which served as the 
basis for organization, would most likely be forgotten 
during longer intervals. Using fewer than ten shapes 
to speed the learning process, in order to decrease 
frequency of exposure to the shapes, would be inadvisable 
for at least two reasons. First, the possible benefit 
for grouping would be lessened as the total number of 
items came within the processing capacity of subjects. 
Secondly, the meaningfulness of the recognition scores 
would be lessened, since the percentages correct would 
be based on a smaller number of items (e.g., 8 out of 
10 correct may be a better indication of performance 
than 4 out of 5). Using more difficult shapes would 
presumably make recognition more difficult, but would 
also increase learning time and, ipso facto, shape 
exposure frequency. Using simpler shapes to speed learning 
and reduce exposure frequency would work, except that the 
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simpler shapes would probably be more easily recognized. 
It appears that the method of inducing organization used 
here, with the stringent criterion of three successive 
correct trials, doe3 not lend itself to the study of 
recognition memory because the overlearning produces, 
inevitably it seems, ceiling effects on the recognition 
test. Other methods of organization (spatial, chromatic, 
categories, etc.) could possibly be used more profitably, 
although Mandler's (1972) requirement of a high degree 
of organization should be kept in mind. 
The learning data proved much more interesting, and 
were analyzed in much detail partly because of the absence 
of exciting recognition data. The discovery of the role 
of processing capacity in equalizing the learning times 
of the two groups and in explaining the main reason for 
differences among subjects in learning speed was the 
most significant aspect of the study. It appeared that 
the limit on learning rate for the random shapes as 
used in the present experiment was 2±1 shapes per trial. 
Comparison of this measure of processing capacity is not 
easily compared to limits established using other 
paradigms. Perhaps it is best to state simply that the 
maximum learning rate for random shapes seemed to indicate 
that they are harder to learn than verbal materials. 
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Some of the subjects in Group 2 reported after the 
experiment that they had visualized two "chunks", with 
"1" shapes in one chunk and "2" shapes in the other. 
Other subjects reported no such distinct imagery, yet 
used associative schemes in which all shapes with the 
same response number were were associated with the same 
mnemonic. A frequently used strategy was to find in the 
shape (in part by self-persuasion) the number that was 
to be associated with it. Some subjects could find 
"ones" in the "1" shapes, but were unable to find "two's" 
in the "2" shapes. These subjects would sometimes adopt 
a strategy which seemed most efficient to the experimenter 
(perhaps because he used such a strategy when he was 
in a similar experiment as a subject): Find something 
similar about one chunk's items and remember that any 
shape not possessing the required characteristic was 
a member of the other chunk. The subject who learned 
in the fewest number of trials (seven trials) reported 
using just such a strategy. Group 10 subjects usually 
learned a separate association for each shape, and were 
able to remember almost every association they had used 
for the one week interval between the learning task 
and the recognition test. 
The development of an adequate way to measure shape 
difficulty was considered worthwhile, though the attempt 
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to determine why some shapes were more difficult than 
others fell short of being conclusive.    The lack of 
similarity of shape difficulty rank orderinga between 
Groups 2 and 10 probably indicated that which shapes 
were confused by the subject depended on the mnemonic 
devices used to remember them, which, in turn, depended 
on the nature of the task specific to each group.    For 
example,   Group 2  subjects who tried to find a "one" in 
the  "1" shapes were bothered by the existence of "2" shapes 
that  contained portions looking like a "1".    Such 
confusions were subtly different for different subjects, 
largely because they tended to focus in on different 
parts of the shapes (as their functional stimulus), and 
even the best attempts of the experimenter to anticipate 
which shapes a particular subject would find difficult 
to discriminate were thwarted.     Group 10 subjects tended 
to have the most difficulty with shapes that did not 
readily look like anything in particular.    The significant 
correlation between Proportion Content Responses and the 
Scheme A difficulty index for Group 10 supports such a 
contention.     Some subjects formed associations to all the 
shapes they could,   and then memorized the number that 
went with the  "shapes that didn't look like anything." 
Since the recognition data were to have been the 
most important data in the experiment, and ceiling effects 
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substantially clouded the results, the paradigm of Richman 
and his associates must he considered limited in its 
applicability to the study of recognition memory. 
The paradigm is, however, interesting from a learning, 
instead of a memory, standpoint. Further work of a 
parametric nature could be done with the paradigm, 
examining the effects of various rates of stimulus 
presentation, difficulty of shapes, and number of response 
categories. 
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